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At 8:16 a.m., on August 6, 1945, the world changed. Fifty-seconds earlier, the Enola 
Gay had dropped an atomic bomb, "Little Boy", from 31,600 feet above Hiroshima, Japan. 
The world was ushered into the nuclear age. After seeing the "initial burst and 'ball of fire,'" 
co-pilot Robert Lewis questioned aloud, "My God, what have we done?" 1 Lewis, nearly six 
miles above the devastation, was responding to the pyrotechnic display. He could only 
imagine the very real damage the bomb had caused. While disagreements exist concerning 
the exact figures, it is undeniable that the bomb and its radioactive effects killed at least 
70,000 people 2 
Though he was one of the first to see its effects, Lewis was not the first to question the 
decision to use the atomic bomb nor would he be the last. The decision still sits at the 
center of one of the most debated historical (as well as historiographic) questions. The focus 
on this episode is justified. This singular event divides the Twentieth Century in numerous 
ways, but perhaps most relevantly it ends a hot and bloody war, and marks the beginning of 
a colder conflict. And since we examine the event in the year 2000, we must try to avoid the 
biases of the post-Cold War era. This paper tries to focus on two different realities: the first 
is what actually, really happened, the true state of affairs, then secondly the perceptions of 
that actuality. 
The historical field relating to Truman's decision is broad, and it would be impossible to 
fairly cover all of the issues of relevance. There are numerous topics of contention: Did fear 
of the Soviet Union affect the decision to use the atomic device? How many casualties 
would an invasion of Japan have caused? Did racism contribute to the decision? Was the 
decision made to justify the two-billion-dollar expenditure on the Manhattan Project? Was 
the decision made because of the sheer unthinking momentum of a bureaucratic juggernaut? 
Was Japan ready to surrender? Did the United States believe that Japan was ready to 
surrender? How did all of these factors come to play in the ultimate decision to use the 
atomic bomb? 
1 W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate, eds., Tile Army Air Force.• ill World War II: Tile Padfic-Mattcrlrom to 
Wagasaki, June 1944 to Augu.,t 1945 (Chicago: University' of Chicago Press, 1953), 5: 716-717 
2 The Japanese estimated 71,000 dead and missing, the Strategic Bombing Survey estimated 70,000 
to 80,000 dead, while the British mission to Japan estimated between 70,000 and 90,000 were killed. 
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While a number of the above motivations have been used to varying degrees to show 
that the decision to drop the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was made for non-military 
reasons, the issue of Japanese surrender appears to be the crucial piece of the revisionist 
argument. This thesis varies from author to author, but there is general agreement on the 
core issues. When viewed from a distance, the thesis appears impervious to criticism. Ooser 
examination reveals its flaws. 
The revisionist thesis, presented first by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey 
and later modified and expanded by Gar Alperowitz, argues that the United States persisted 
needlessly with its policy of unconditional surrender. This continuation was partially the 
fault of a failed understanding of the Japanese culture and, in particular, the position of the 
emperor in that society. Further, the United States had to use the bomb to justify its cost. 
The decision was also motivated by atomic diplomacy: the use of the bomb as a tool to 
intimidate the U.S.S.R. and gain concessions in the post-war world. The United States' 
strategic bombing campaign, when combined with the increasing control of the sea lanes had 
largely destroyed the Japanese war economy. Despite the fact that the Japanese viewed the 
unconditional surrender policy as national annihilation, that nation's leadership was so 
assured of a military defeat that they were quickly seeking peace. The entry of the Soviet 
Union into the war against Japan would have been a tremendous blow to morale, and 
probably would have caused immediate Japanese capitulation. Further, even if invasion were 
a necessity, and the revisionist consensus concludes that it was not, such an invasion would 
have caused only a relatively small number of casualties. From these premises, the 
revisionists conclude that the decision to use the bomb was not made out of military 
necessity, and that Japan would most likely have surrendered by November 1, 1945, and 
surely would have surrendered by December 31, 1945 even if the bomb had not been used.3 
These arguments, however, are not internally consistent. The revisionists' must 
conclude that Truman was full of contradictions: he was power-hungry, deceptive, ignorant, 
simplistic, hate-filled, compassionate, heavily influenced by his advisors, while being weakly 
influenced by his advisors. The argument that Truman, and his Secretary of State, James F. 
Byrnes, were both ignorant and Machiavellian is, in my opinion, untenable and largely 
spurious. And though it would be easier to attack this straw man of the opponent rather 
than the facts of history, the reality also supports a more traditionalist view: Japan was not 
ready to surrender, they would not have done so in the immediate future, and the decision to 
use the atomic bomb was made on military grounds. 
Thus, the issue of Japanese surrender is at the forefront. Why would the Japanese 
surrender? The answer, as it is normally presented, is that Japan's war economy had 
collapsed and she could no longer continue resisting because her people were near starvation. 
The statistics for this are nebulous, and there is very little support for this in the testimony 
More recent estimates conclude that up to 200,000 may have died as a result of the atomic bomb. See 
Dennis Wainstock, 17tc Dcci.<io11 to Use the Atomic Bomb (Westport, Cf: Praeger, 1996), 86. 
·• These precise and arbitrary dates were presented by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey [henceforth 
USSBS],/apan'.< Struggle to End the War (Washington, D.C.: GPO. 1946), 13. 
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of captured Japanese leaders after the war. In actuality the statistics seem to show that prior 
to the very end of 1945, things were going fairly well for Japanese agriculture. Even in 1945, 
when every perceivable stress had been placed on the Japanese, the situation was such that 
they probably could have sustained themselves for another six months to a year. By arguing 
that Japan was not on the verge of mass starvation, the cornerstone of the revisionist 
argument is removed. Starvation was the motivation for their scenario, and without it, the 
scenario as a whole seems significantly less likely. 
The revisionists have built their persuasive argument around the assertion that a joint 
sea and air blockade caused the collapse of the Japanese war economy. In particular, they 
argue that there was a dire food shortage that would have quickly caused mass starvation. 
They also claim that the food shortage led to a loss of morale and absenteeism. This critical 
loss was exacerbated by the strategic bombing and the gradual collapse of the war economy 
caused by an increasing deficiency of raw materials and the destruction of factories. This 
collapse of the national economy, particularly mass starvation, would have forced even the 
Japanese hard-liners to capitulate. This theory is best articulated, ironically, by the United 
States Strategic Bombing Survey and its Vice-Chairman, Paul H. Nitze. 
The USSBS was to evaluate the effects of strategic bombing. It was established 
pursuant to a directive of President Roosevelt to "conduct an impartial and expert study on 
the effects of aerial attack" on Germany and Japan, "to establish a basis for evaluating the 
importance and potentialities of air power as an instrument of military strategy for planning 
the future development of United States armed forces."4 This mandate gave the USSBS 
broad goals. When Truman gave his specific instructions to the Pacific War survey, he 
broadened the mandate further by including naval as well as air corps personnel. Also, the 
inclusion of post-war planning into the objectives, helped lead to the occurrence of "mission 
creep." The USSBS attempted to evaluate events that were only tangentially related to their 
core subject: the unique impact of atomic bombs, investigate why the Japanese attacked 
Pearl Harbor, and why they ultimately surrendered.' 
Nitze ultimately played a significant role in the USSBS reports concerning the war in 
the Pacific. The USSBS was chaired by Franklin D'Oiier, president of the Prudential 
Insurance Company, and Nitze was one of several people under D'Olier who went on to 
have prestigious careers. However, D'Olier had difficulty persuading survey employees to 
transfer to the Pacific, and of the civilian directors, only Nitze was willing to take a major 
responsibility for the Pacific Survey." Nitze's conclusions prior to making his "impartial and 
objective study" are therefore very important in understanding the ultimate conclusions 
reached by the USSBS. 
• USSBS, 771c Effect.< of Air Attach 011 Japa11e.<c. Urba11 Eco11omy (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947), iii. 
' Robert Newman, Tnuna11 a11d the Hiro.vhima Cult (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 
1995), 34-5. 
''Ibid., 33, 35. 
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In June 1945, Nitze met with the Joint Target Group to discuss his view of the effect of 
strategic bombing upon Japan. His arguments then are evident in the findings he presented 
a year later. He argued that by attacking the essential lines of transportation they could 
isolate Japanese islands from one another and hence fragment the base of Japanese 
operations. The "interdiction of the lines of transportation would be sufficiently effective ... 
that the bombing of urban industrial areas would not be necessary.· Nitze concluded along 
with Fred Searles that Japan would surrender in matter of months; Nitze predicted that 
Japan would capitulate by November 1945. However, the Joint Chiefs did not concur with 
Nitze and Searles estimate and felt invasion was still necessary for surrender. That in turn 
would prompt Truman to choose to use the atomic bomb.7 
Nitze's account contains numerous important facts, but three should be noted 
specifically. He had already formulated the basic conclusion to the USSBS before he 
surveyed the facts. The date of November 1945 for capitulation is also indicative. After 
thirteen months of research, Nitze concludes that Japan would have surrendered if the 
atomic bomb had not been dropped most likely by the I November 1945.H Second, Nitze's 
views were not necessarily in accord with other military advisors, namely the Joint Chiefs. 
And, as a peripheral issue, Truman's decision was made in accord with his military advisors' 
belief that bombing and a blockade alone would not cause capitulation. 
It seems difficult to believe that Nitze's data was precise enough to warrant a date by 
which the Japanese would probably have surrendered. And when examining the data used 
by the USSBS, it is frequently inconclusive, and certainly does not merit such an emphatic 
statement as the conclusion explicitly stated in two of the three reports issued by the Survey 
that, "certainly prior to December 31, 1945, and in all probability prior to November I, 
1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if 
Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or 
contemplated.'"' 
To support this conclusion, Nitze points to the continuing air-sea encirclement of 
Japan. The "blockade was having an effect. People were starving in Japan.... They couldn't 
even ship between islands. They would soon run out of food. This would cause the Emperor 
to work for peace. • This would force the Japanese to surrender; "even the military don't like 
to see all their people starve to death.""' 
However, this conclusion does not correspond necessarily to the data in the USSBS 
reports. In particular, the Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division produced a 
lengthy report in January 194 7, titled 1Jze Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utilization 
7 Paul B. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glamost: At tiiC Center of Decision (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 
1989), 36-7, quoted in Ne111.111an, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 34. 
'USSBS. fal'au's Struggle, 13 
''Ibid.; idem, Summary RcJ10rt (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), 26. 
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of Manpower. The blockade was having serious difficulty in cutting off Japanese food 
supplies. While the islands were largely dependent on imports for many raw materials, 
surprisingly they were largely self-sustaining agriculturally: "from 1931 to 1940 I 9 percent of 
Japan's food supply, on a caloric basis, was imported." This would increase to 20 percent by 
1941, but then would gradually decline to only 9 percent. 11 It is important to note that even 
if the embargo completely stopped all importation of food, it would have affected only one-
fifth of the Japanese food supply. The removal of 10 percent of a former source for food 
imports is a significant hardship, but there is no evidence to indicate that people were dying 
in Japan of starvation, or that such mass starvation would have happened before the end of 
I946. 
A close examination of food imports shows why the blockade was unable to cut the 
island nation off entirely from its foreign supplies. First, it must be noted that Japan 
depended only on imports of certain crops, namely rice ( 17% of which was imported), 
soybeans (21%), sugar (84%), wheat (2I%), and other grains and beans (37%). It received 
these crops from various sources. "Rice was imported principally from Korea and Formosa 
[present-day Taiwan], sugar from Formosa and the Netherlands Indies [present-day 
Indonesia], wheat from Australia, Canada, and the United States, and soybeans and other 
grains and beans from Manchuria.'' 12 
Clearly, once the Greater East Asian War began, Japan lost almost all of its wheat 
imports from Anglo-American countries, but all of its other imports were with occupied 
territories across the Sea of Japan. Rice imports, as a percentage of total production, 
decreased throughout the war, partially due to poor harvests in Korea. Sugar production 
tapered off as well. However, for soybeans along with other grains and beans, Japan was able 
to maintain the same percentage of imports throughout the war. 
The Sea of Japan was largely insulated from the enclosing Allied "ring of steel," and 
hence imports continued. B-29s mined the harbors of western Japan with mines, while some 
submarines were able to sneak into the Sea of Japan. The effects of the mining were 
ultimately crippling. During the last five months of the war, B-29s flew I ,528 mining sorties 
and planted 12,053 mines. Half of the shipping tonnage lost during this period was lost to 
mines. Still, neither the Straits of Tsushima in the south nor the La Perouse Straits in the 
north had been breached by surface vessels.l:l 
The evidence, however, even taking into account the mining, is not conclusive. Despite 
the growing loss of shipping; and the consistent loss of supplies, raw materials, and 
fertilizers; the crop for 1944 had by almost all measures increased over that of the previous 
"'Newman, 37. 
11 USSBS, 17~e Japa11csc Wartime Sta11dard of Living aud Utilizatiou of Maupowcr (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 1947). 2. 
12 Ibid. 
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year. First, per acre yield of almost all crops seemed to be improving. Wheat, naked barley, 
and barley all showed marked improvements in 1944. Rice, while still continuing a per acre 
yield decline that began in 1942, seemed to be. moving towards stabilization or recovery. 
This decline was not, however, a sign the United States' campaign was taking a toll on 
Japanese agriculture, but was a random fluctuation. The USSBS survey has difficulty 
explaining away this fact, mentioning: "It is significant to note ... that rice yields were 
maintained at prewar levels. The cause of this phenomenon was primarily the precedence 
given rice in the factors of production, especially with respect to fertilizer. "14 This type of 
note is typical. The USSBS presents what would seem to be generally favorable data, and 
tries to mitigate that data with some exception explaining why the data is not truly 
representative of the situation. Although that is clearly true at certain points, the USSBS 
documents seem to go to great lengths to reach their conclusion. 
The Survey found a trend towards both decreased arable land and cultivated acreage, 
and placed causality on numerous things, but mostly on a "progressively tighter farm labor 
situation." It concluded that it was very likely that the trend, which became pronounced in 
!943, continued at an accelerated pace until the end of the war. However, these trends, 
which would seem to decrease productivity, clearly do not. One explanation could be that 
only the most fertile fields were cultivated when there was less manpower available; however, 
there is no evidence presented in the reports that demonstrates this. 
The USSBS summarizes, "The decline in Japanese agricultural production between 
1941 and 1945 was considerably influenced by a shortage of able-bodied farm labor." 
Specifically, "This manpower shortage contributed to the reduction of land under 
cultivation ... and resulted in the use of less efficient farm labor, mainly women and older 
members of the farming households. The decline in labor efficiency along with the restricted 
use of chemical fertilizers were mainly responsible for reducing the per-acre yields of land 
under cultivation." 1' However, we can note that there was no decline in efficienry evident in 
any of the data presented in the USSBS report. In fact, the available data seem to imply 
that, despite an increase of "less efficient labor," productivity actually increased in 1944. 16 
The USSBS conclusions are at odds with the data used to determine them. 
The biggest factor affecting production seems not to be the strategic bombing or the 
blockade, which were having a significant impact, but the weather: "Exceptional weather 
conditions adversely affected production in 1941 and !945 while favorable weather 
n John Ray Skates, 77rc llwa.<iou of faf11lll: Altentatil'c to tile Bomb (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1994), 44, 49-50. 
"USSBS, Staudard <f Liviug, 6-7. 
"Ibid., 9. 
'"While clearly the manpower shortage was not felt as intensely until 1945, in 1944 there were 
already the beginnings of a reorientation of manpower in agriculture, with a three percent decrease for 
men in the labor force when compared to the 1940 statistic. See USSBS, 17tc Ejfcct.< <f Strategic Bom!Ji11g 011 
/tl[Jtltt's War Economy, 3 I. 
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conditions were especially beneficial only in 1942.... The I 945 rice crop, however, was a 
disastrous failure and the 1945 spring crops were also below normal, due to unusually poor 
weather during the growing seasons. "17 
Hence, it is only in 1945, that production decreases in principal foods are really 
noticeable: rice, wheat, barley, naked barley and fruits all experienced a significant decrease 
in tonnage. Although there was an increase in the production of soybeans, sweet potatoes, 
potatoes, and other vegetables in 1945, the caloric level of those crops underwent a 
substantial decrease compared to the year before. IH 
Agricultural production from I 941 to I 945, then, ultimately showed a decline in both 
food imports and domestic production. The situation was soon becoming dire, but it still is 
not evident from the data available that surrender would have occurred before the end of 
1945. First, the ration system, despite its inefficiencies, was providing staples to the 
Japanese people at a level determined by gender and type of labor. Further, the military's 
rations were only beginning to be reduced by the end of the war. Until 1945, the military 
enjoyed a complete daily ration, and it would be simplistic to argue that by mid-1945 they 
would be unable to fight. Also, scavenging was proving to be an adequate means of 
augmenting caloric intake for both the military and the public. One such campaign was put 
forth by the Board of Technology. In the first week of July, it announced that it would begin 
processing 150 million acorns as a supplement to the basic staple ration. This came at the 
same time that the Japanese government began a program to manufacture starch from potato 
vines and other plants. 1'' If the war had continued, no doubt further alternative methods 
would have extended the food capacity for additional months. As a whole, the domestic 
food production oscillated during the war, and only markedly declined in 1945, hence 
causing the new initiatives. According to the USSBS, holding the 1931-40 average as 100 
for an index value, in 1941 the index value was 91, for 1942 it was 102, for 1943 it was 94, 
for 1944 it was 93, and finally for I 945 it dropped to 7 4.20 
The Survey also points out repeatedly that such a figure is biased by an overabundance 
of staple carbohydrates and not enough supplementary foods, and this caused a qualitative 
paucity of the Japanese diet.21 However, more recent scholarship seems to suggest that the 
Japanese diet was more balanced than originally thought. T. R. H. Haven notes that in 1945 
the Japanese people "took in just I ,793 calories a day ... yet even then the amount of protein 
17 USSBS, Sta11dard of LiPillg, 3. 
"Ibid. 
'''Gar Alperovitz, The Deci.1iOII to U.1e the Atomic Bomb (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 22. 
'" USSBS, Sta11dard of Lil>i11g, 2. 
21 Ibid., I 9. 
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people were eating held up reasonably well." And by way of summary, he adds, "To the very 
end people managed to find food, however sparse or untasty.n22 
There can be no doubt, the food situation was worsening. D. D. Wainstock 
summarizes the situation well in a recent work that argues for a revisionist thesis. He 
asserts, "Before Pearl Harbor, the average caloric intake of the Japanese people was about 
2,000 calories per day as against 3,400 in the United States. By the summer of 1945, it was 
about 1,680." He explains further, "In reality, on the average, the Japanese consumed 10 
percent less than the Germans ate during the worst period of World War I under the British 
blockade. The average Japanese had only one small bowl of watered soup for breakfast and 
some pickles, and a piece of fish and a few vegetables for lunch. Supper was mostly a 
repetition of breakfast. "2 'l 
Wainstock's quote is insightful for a number of reasons. First, it must be noted that 
comparatively the Japanese were used to a lower per day calorie intake than the Western 
nations. Secondly, the description of the average meal was more or less the description of 
the average meal throughout the 1930s as well, though the meal in 1945 was smaller. 
Thirdly, the reference to the British blockade is interesting, because it must be noted that 
ultimately further military action was required to bring about an armistice with the Germans 
in the First World War. Finally, though, Wainstock produces a third figure for the average 
calorie intake in 1945. It is apparent that the evidence varies, and the range that these 
figures provide is from the USSBS's low figure of 1480, Wainstock's estimate of 1640, and 
T. R. H. Haven's estimate of 1793. These figures, when further analyzed, lead to several 
different calculations of consumption versus the pre-war norm. The range is from USSBS's 
74 percent, Wainstock's 84 percent, and Haven's 89.65 percent. If Haven's 89.65 percent is 
correct, it is very near indeed to the USSBS's estimate of the Japanese diet in 1941 (91 
percent), when no one in Japan felt that mass starvation was even a remote threat, and no 
one felt that their "meager" diet was sufficient reason to give up hope.H If nothing else, this 
range in statistics provides evidence of a general lack of consensus over the true state of 
affairs in Japan in mid- I 945. 
Whatever the actual proportion, Japan was able to maintain its food distribution 
because of the centralization of the process. All imported food goods and domestic products 
were distributed through the ration system. Near the end of the war, the Japanese 
government had to reduce levels of rice in the staple ration, largely because of the abysmal 
I 945 crop. An increase in potatoes and sweet potatoes allowed the substitution of one 
" Thomas R. H. Havens, Vallt:y of Dar/;ncs.>: The fapauc.<c Peoj•lc and World War Two (New York: 
Norton, 1978), 130-2, quoted in Newman, 38. 
'"'Wainstock. 12. 
" It is possible that the USSBS estimates are generally conservative andlor Haven is generally liberal 
and the comparison between Haven and USSBS is not valid. However, both documents are drawing from 
similar sources to extrapolate caloric intake and both are using 2,000 calories per day as the basis, so it 
would seem that the comparison is justified. 
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carbohydrate for another, though clearly not in equal caloric levels to the past.25 In what 
seems to be desperation on the part of the reporters, the survey concludes: 
The adulteration of the staple rice ration with substitute foods, such as barley and 
potatoes, unquestionably had an adverse psychological effect on the Japanese 
consumer. Although he could obtain virtually the same amount of calories from the 
adulterated ration, he would not be as satisfied with it, just as an American would 
feel dissatisfied at obtaining his proteins from cheese or soybeans instead of from 
meat. Such dissatisfaction would unquestionably affect the morale of a worker and 
tend to lower his efficiency.u' 
It seems impossible to believe that a populace, whose morale had not been destroyed by 
daily bombing, would succumb to defeatism because they were not satisfied by the way their 
food tastedP Any morale decrease would probably have been very small, although it could 
have been a minor factor in any cumulative decrease in Japanese morale. Even if the 
increasingly small ration affected morale, whether it was barley, potatoes, or rice, it probably 
did not have any statistically noticeable effect, and the USSBS presents only one anecdote 
from a minor staff officer to support the claim.28 
Also, it must be noted that while the Japanese government was rationing it was also 
storing food for emergency shortages in the future. Though the unprecedentedly poor rice 
crop of 1945 was ominous, it can be assumed that government storage of foodstuffs were 
sufficient to at least sustain the population of Japan until mid-1946. The crop was being 
harvested in 1945, even if it was low in quantity, and the USSBS estimates the stock on 
hand of rice was 133,000 tons, or a 10-day supply.2" If this figure is correct, the poor 
harvest would have caused severe shocks to the Japanese ration system, and the starvation 
issue would have loomed large for the first time. Even if the USSBS estimate is valid, these 
"At the beginning of the war, the domestic rice production was 10,146,000 metric tons. Domestic 
production of the two classes of potato was 4,528,000 metric tons. Thus, the ratio was about 10:4.5. 
The 1945 figure is substantially different. The rice crop, largely because of poor weather, was low at 
6,600,000, while the potato crop ""'s substantially larger at 7,970,000. This ratio is 10:12. USSBS, 
Sta11dard of Liviug, 3. 
21
' Ibid., I 03. 
27 Referring to morale decreases caused by the bombing, Toyoda Soemu, a member of the Supreme 
War Guidance Council in 1945, stated, "The effect on the people's morale \\'35 not as great as we had 
feared.... There was no idea that we must give up the war to avoid even a single additional day of 
bombing." USSBS, Naval Analysis Division, l11tcrrogatiou., of fapmlc.•c Officials (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1946), 2: 323. 
28 USSBS, Sta11dard of LiPi11g, I 03. 
'" Ibid., 16. 
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first shocks would not have signified the collapse of the Japanese agricultural economy, and 
still it seems unlikely that mass starvation would have occurred at this point. However, with 
that said, several reports seem to point to larger reserves of rice. 
Yoshida Shigeru, prime minister from 1946·4 7, observed that while food was short 
during the postwar occupation, the Japanese relied on "the food stored in different parts of 
the country during the war-stocks that most fortunately proved to be far more abundant 
than was expected.":"' A similar observation was made by Herbert Passin, a member of the 
U.S. occupation forces: "During the last year or so of the war, the Japanese military had 
stored away several years' supply of food, clothing, raw materials, equipment, and funds in 
its arsenals, caves, and other hiding places.":" 
Surrender by starvation is a very unsure thing. To place a specific date on such an 
event as agricultural collapse would be mistaken. Some people surely did starve. There were 
instances where Japanese soldiers on islands cut off from supply accepted starvation rather 
than surrender. The Japanese people were in a deteriorated physical state, which made them 
more susceptible to diseases caused or exacerbated by malnutrition.32 However, when taking 
an objective view of the data, mass starvation was notin the immediate future for Japan at 
mid-1945. Malnutrition, while becoming a problem, had not reached an unbearable state for 
Japan's people or their war economy. Those factors, then, cannot be viewed as serious 
motivations for their ultimate decision to surrender. The fact that Nitze and the USSBS 
concluded that starvation was near, point to their willingness to ignore facts that seem to 
discredit their "surrender thesis." 
If the evidence does not seem to match the thesis, that appears to imply a bias on the 
part of the researcher. Evidence suggests that Nitze was heavily influenced by his fellow 
naval and aerial officers on the Pacific survey team. The USSBS report favored the role 
played by the Navy and the Army Air Force. Surprisingly enough, it is the Navy and Army 
Air Force (AAF) staff that wrote the USSBS. Its conclusions heavily favor the roles that the 
Navy and the AAF sought. The Navy felt that its embargo had had a crippling effect on 
Japan, and that the blockade could have succeeded without any help from ground forces (an 
invasion), foreign assistance (Russian intervention), or new elaborate weapons programs (the 
atomic bomb). The Navy had always assumed that a blockade alone would not be sufficient, 
but that strategic bombing (perhaps with their own bomber force) would be necessary to 
achieve capitulation.:n 
The AAF was happy to oblige its new role. Since World War I aerial strategists had 
been pursuing three objectives: 
'iu Newntan, 38. 
11 Herbert Passin, "The Occupation: Some Reflections," in Carol Gluck and Stephen Graubard, eds., 
Showa: 17tc japa11 of Hiroltito (New York: Norton, 1992), Ill, quoted in Newman, 38. 
11 USSBS, Stamlard of Lil>iug, 100-2. 
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Above all, air officers sought independence for air power and parity with the army 
and the navy. They chafed at the ground support mission, and they wanted 
recognition for an independent, war-winning role for airpower-strategic bombing. 
Finally, they wanted to develop a long-range heavy bomber [the B-29] to carry out 
that mission.34 
The USSBS supported these roles and doctrines, not necessarily intentionally favoring 
the portion of the military that wrote the survey, but more realistically because those 
personnel saw the world through the light of their field. Thus, the USSBS' conclusion "that 
certainly prior to December 31, 1945, and in all probability prior to November I, 1945, 
Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if 
Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated" 
must be understood in this context."' Simply put, the authors of the report had both certain 
biases and agendas that appear in the report's conclusions. 
In actuality, there is little evidence to support the contention that these actions alone 
would have caused surrender, though they clearly were taking a toll on Japan's war economy. 
And despite the Survey's claim that it reached the opinion "based on a detailed investigation 
of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved," 
the facts do not seem to be conclusive, and the surviving Japanese leaders seem to be 
emphatic that surrender was not imminent prior to August 6. 
R. P. Newman has done a thorough survey of the interrogations and concludes: 
Early surrender? With no atom bombs, no Russians, no invasion? Careful 
inspection of the "testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved" --even that 
incomplete sample available to the USSBS during its two short months in 1945-
shows only [Marquis] !Gdo [Koichi, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal] supporting 
Nitze, everyone else [including more than twenty other high level officials] stating 
that Japan would have fought on indefinitely. When would Japan have surrendered 
without the bomb and the Russians? The on!Y credible answer is that given by 
Robert Butow when Freeman Dyson asked him about it: "The Japanese leaders 
themselves do not know the answer to that question.""" 
Two further criticisms may be leveled at the USSBS report. First, there was a good deal 
of infighting between the AAF and the Navy staff of the USSBS, which brings into question 
·n Skates, 44. 
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the credibility and veracity of the report, and made consensus difficult. It seems that Nitze 
favored the MF when it conflicted with the Navy's presentation of facts, much to the 
Navy's chagrinY An extreme example is Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie's criticisms of the report, 
in particular the portion submitted by survey member Maj. Gen. Orvil Anderson of the AAF. 
These are the brutal criticisms of the top naval officer on the Pacific survey of the top air 
force officer. "The volume presents a completely inaccurate and entirely biased account of 
our war with Japan which is of absolutely no historical value, consistently misrepresents 
facts, and indeed, often ignores facts and employs falsehoods." He does not stop there, 
"From this light treatment of the Pacific war, the authors have arrived at a series of biased 
conclusions which ... impose a threat to our future security.":lH 
The final criticism that can be leveled at the USSBS is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did 
not feel that the blockade, at the levels of 1945, would have been sufficient to force Japan's 
surrender. In particular, the Joint Chiefs were wary of expanding the blockade, either as 
preparation to the invasion or as the sole alllied strategy. The JCS chose not to pursue these 
options for a number of reasons. Intensifying the blockade would require moving troops to 
the west of Japan, along Formosa, and the Chinese coast, etc. General Douglas MacArthur, 
Commander Southwest Pacific Army, argued against such a plan, explaining that "peripheral 
operations would tie up a great part of the American resources in the Pacific so that Japan 
could be invaded only after redeployment· from Europe. Lodgments on the China coast 
carried the danger of drawing American forces into 'heavy involvement' on the Asian 
mainland and perhaps of postponing the invasion of Japan into !94 7." He argued that a 
series of these operations, "prior to the delivery of the main attack would result in greater 
loss of life." Commenting on bombing and blockade alone, he felt "such a strategy would 
'prolong the war indefinitely,' and it assumed that the Japanese could be subdued by air 
power alone 'in spite of its demonstrated failure in Europe:•:!<> 
While MacArthur had his own army biases, it should be noted that both General 
George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander in 
chief, Pacific fleet and commander in chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINC-PAC and CINC-
POA), agreed with MacArthur's thesis that blockade alone would not be sufficient. As such, 
the JCS did not support a continuation of the blockade, because they felt that it would be 
insufficient to cause Japan's unconditional surrender. 
After examining the preponderance of evidence, it appears that this portion of the 
revisionist argument has been refuted. Japan was not about to experience mass starvation in 
mid-1945, so that had little perceivable effect on the decision to surrender. It would seem 
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that from the Japanese could have maintained themselves for another year, which would 
have made the end of the war a costly process indeed for the Allies and the Japanese 
themselves. It is perhaps safe to say that initially, without examining other crucial issues, the 
decision to drop the atomic bomb does not appear inconsistent with the Japanese 
agricultural situation. That situation, in fact, appears to support such a drastic decision as a 
means to significantly shorten a conflict that did not appear about to end in the immediate 
future. 
Finally, the USSBS itself is severely called into question. Its central thesis is 
unsubstantiated and as the report The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utilization of 
Manpower shows, the USSBS took ambiguous data and produced conclusions favorable to 
those presenting the report, namely air force and naval officers. Interdepartmental conflict 
severely limited the ability to build consensus out of the data, which is why at times the 
reports seemed disjointed and contradictory. The available evidence at hand destroys the 
myth that has been central to our thinking about the Japanese surrender. The revision of the 
revisionists has begun. 
